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Non-Technical Summary
European countries provide a number of different active labor market policy programs to reduce the
risk of and the amount of long-term unemployment. Programs focus on particular sets of barriers
to employment, such as lack of motivation (via sanctions) or lack of job search skills (via job search
assistance) or lack of experience (via wage subsidies) or lack of marketable skills (via training
programs). They do not focus on many other barriers. Numerous studies have been conducted to
analyze the effectiveness of these activities. The results clarify that a number of programs are not
very successful reaching the intended goals. The major reason may be that the available programs
do not (or do not fully) meet the needs of the unemployed. On the one hand, specific needs may
be unobservable to (or unrecognized by) the caseworker in charge, on the other hand, the set of
available programs and activities may be incomplete or inflexible to address the needs correctly.
Analyzing the factors driving employment chances, therefore, is a necessary step to shed light on
the needs of job seekers and to derive recommendations for a (re-)arrangement of active labor market
policy according to those needs.
In this paper, differences in the employability between short-term and long-term unemployed persons
are studied in order to reveal the crucial factors of job-finding chances regarding unemployment
duration in a comparative static way. The empirical analysis is based on unique survey data of
short-term and long-term unemployed persons merged with administrative data for Germany. These
data include usually unavailable information of job-seekers covering, e.g., soft skills, concessions the
job-seeker is willing to make for a new job, health and the time able to work a day, importance
of peers, self-assessed job finding chances and a set of obstacles for employment integration like
financial debts, care obligations for children or frail elderly or substance abuse including alcohol.
The employment gap of short-term and long-term unemployed is decomposed into explained and
unexplained differences using the group of short-term unemployed as a reference group representing
high employability.
The results highlight three significant and important findings: First, differences in skills measured
by elementary skills, formal education and soft skills could explain a small part of the employment
gap between short-term and long-term unemployed persons only. Hence, providing courses that aim
at increasing skills of the individuals (at least in Germany) may reduce the employment gap, but the
scope is limited. Moreover, this may explain why training programs in Europe and particularly in
Germany are not more successful in employment integration of participants. Second, differences in
obstacles to employment measured in terms of substance abuse, financial debts or care obligations
are crucial. If long-term unemployed persons would be equal in characteristics to the short-term
unemployed, the employment gap between both groups would be clearly more narrow. Third,
differences in the state of health and in particular limitations in working ability account largely for
the employment gap. For this reason, policy makers should spend more attention on the last two
findings when designing the placement process. The set of active labor market programs should be
revised addressing these aspects in order to increase employability of the participants.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Programme der aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik werden in vielen europa¨ischen La¨ndern eingesetzt, um
das Risiko und den Umfang der Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit zu verringern. Die eingesetzten Aktivita¨ten
orientieren sich hierbei an spezifischen Problemen: eine geringe Motivation oder Kooperationsbe-
reitschaft in der Arbeitsuche soll z.B. durch die Verha¨ngung von Sanktionen u¨berwunden werden,
Defizite in der Arbeitsuche sollen durch kurzfristige Trainingsmaßnahmen behoben werden, Fortbil-
dung und berufliche Weiterbildung zielen auf die Verbesserung der Qualifikation ab und zu geringe
Arbeitserfahrung ist Gegenstand der subventionierten Bescha¨ftigung. Trotz des umfangreichen In-
strumentariums werden viele weitere Eingliederungshemmnisse nicht oder nur wenig beru¨cksichtigt.
In einer ganzen Reihe empirischer Studien sind die Wirkungen der unterschiedlichen Maßnahmen
evaluiert worden. Im Allgemeinen zeigen die Ergebnisse aber bestenfalls ma¨ßig positive Erfolge der
Aktivita¨ten im Hinblick auf die intendierten Ziele. Ein wichtiger Grund hierfu¨r ist mo¨glicherweise,
dass sich die Bedu¨rfnisse der Arbeitsuchenden in den Maßnahmen nur unvollsta¨ndig widerspiegeln.
Um diese ada¨quat beru¨cksichtigen zu ko¨nnen, ist allerdings eine Identifikation und Bestimmung
der Relevanz eine Voraussetzung. Ausgehend davon ko¨nnen dann Handlungsempfehlungen fu¨r die
Arbeitsmarktpolitik abgeleitet werden.
In dieser Studie werden die Unterschiede in der Bescha¨ftigungsfa¨higkeit zwischen Kurzzeit- und
Langzeitarbeitslosen analysiert, um die Bedeutung der einzelnen Faktoren fu¨r eine erfolgreiche Job-
suche zu identifizieren. Die Verwendung kombinierter Erhebungs- und Registerdaten der Bunde-
sagentur fu¨r Arbeit erlaubt hierbei die Beru¨cksichtigung interessanter Merkmale, wie z.B. Soft Skills,
Konzessionsbereitschaft, Lernbereitschaft, gesundheitliche Einschra¨nkungen, besondere Hemmnisse
einer Eingliederung, insbesondere Schulden oder Pflegeverpflichtungen. Durch Dekomposition des
Abstands in der Bescha¨ftigungsfa¨higkeit ko¨nnen Unterschiede aufgrund beobachtbarer und un-
beobachtbarer Eigenschaften der Gruppen unterschieden werden.
Die empirischen Ergebnisse fu¨hren zu drei wichtigen Schlussfolgerungen: 1) Unterschiede in der
Qualifikation erkla¨ren nur einen kleinen Teil des Unterschieds in der Bescha¨ftigungsfa¨higkeit. Es
ist daher zu erwarten, dass Programme, die auf solche Defizite abstellen, nur bedingt wirksam sein
ko¨nnen. Dies kann auch eine Erkla¨rung fu¨r die ma¨ßigen Erfolge der Fo¨rderung der beruflichen
Weiterbildung in Deutschland sein. 2) Unterschiede in den Hemmnissen, wie Schulden oder Pflege-
verpflichtungen, spielen eine zentrale Rolle fu¨r eine reduzierte Vermittlung der Langzeitarbeitslosen.
3) Gesundheitliche Einschra¨nkungen liegen ha¨ufiger vor und die ta¨gliche Arbeitsfa¨higkeit ist eben-
falls deutlich geringer bei den Langzeitarbeitslosen. Insbesondere die letzten beiden Ergebnisse
werden bisher zu wenig im Vermittlungsprozess beru¨cksichtigt. Daher sollten die Programme der
aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik im Hinblick auf diese Aspekte u¨berarbeitet bzw. erga¨nzt werden, um
die Bescha¨ftigungsfa¨higkeit ihrer Teilnehmer zu erho¨hen.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the determinants of employability differences between short-term and
long-term unemployed persons. Knowing these differences could help to address active labor
market policy programs more adequately to the needs of the job-seekers in order to increase
employment integration. Based on merged survey and register data differences in job finding
chances of these groups are decomposed into a part due to differences in attributes and a part
due to differences in valuing the attributes. The estimates clarify that current active labor
market programs do not address important factors of employment. Particularly, health of the
job seekers, limitations in the working ability and obstacles to employment comprising substance
abuse, financial debts or care obligations for children or frail elderly play a significant role for
successful placement. The conclusion is that policy makers should integrate these aspects in the
placement process.
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1 Introduction
Reducing the risk of long-term unemployment is one central purpose of labor market policy. Al-
though particularly European countries provide a number of different active labor market policy
programs to reduce the risk of and the amount of long-term unemployment, these countries suffer
from high long-term unemployment rates. Long-term unemployment is conventionally defined as
those who have been continuously unemployed for at least one year. Figure 1 provides shares of
long-term unemployment on total unemployment for a selection of OECD countries in 2006. It
becomes obvious that Germany, Belgium, Italy, Poland and Portugal experience long-term unem-
ployed shares of all unemployed of more than 50 percent. In contrast, the situation in countries like
Australia, Canada or the US is less severe; here, the shares are between 10 to 20 percent.
Figure 1: Shares of long-term unemployment on total unemployment in selected OECD countries
(2006)
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The active labor market programs provided in many countries focus on particular sets of barriers
to employment, such as lack of motivation (via sanctions) or lack of job search skills (via job search
assistance) or lack of experience (via wage subsidies) or lack of marketable skills (via training
programs). They do not focus on many other barriers. However, the extensive overviews by Martin
and Grubb (2001) and Kluve (2006) clarify that a number of programs are not very successful
reaching the intended goals. The ineffectiveness could be due to a number of reasons. For example,
if people participate in a program they could be expected to reduce their job-search intensity
during the program which counteracts the intended effects (locking-in effects, see e.g. van Ours,
2004). Moreover, participation in programs could be interpreted as a negative signal by potential
employers, i.e. a lower productivity of the job-seeker, particularly for persons in subsidized jobs in
a non-competitive market, see e.g. Thomsen (2007). Another source could be an inefficient match
of job-seekers to available programs. The main reasons for this are the behavior of the caseworkers
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or the general set-up of the placement process. For example, Berger, Black, and Smith (2001) and
Lechner and Smith (2007) show how the allocation of job-seekers into programs could be improved
based on comparing estimated impacts of several programs.1 A limitation of those attempts is that
they could be accomplished ex post only taking the set of available programs as given.
Although these three reasons have been proved to be relevant for the disappointing success of active
labor market programs, the major reason may be that the available programs do not (or do not
fully) meet the needs of the unemployed. On the one hand, specific needs may be unobservable to
(or unrecognized by) the caseworker in charge, on the other hand, the set of available programs and
activities may be incomplete or inflexible to address the needs correctly. For example, various studies
have shown that health affects labor supply (Bartel and Taubman, 1979; Contoyannis and Rice,
2001) or, more detailed, that there are effects of substance abuse (Gill and Michaels 1992) or smoking
behavior (Levine, Gustafson, and Velenchik, 1997; Cutler and Glaeser, 2005) but particularly the
latter factors are typically neither regarded in labor market programs nor in evaluation studies.2
Analyzing the factors driving employment chances, therefore, is a reasonable first step to shed light
on the needs of job seekers. Moreover, the effects of the single factors may change over time, i.e.
some factors that are of minor importance for the probability of leaving unemployment during
the first weeks may be of larger relevance later in the unemployment spell.3 Therefore, regarding
time-variation is necessary to derive correct policy recommendations for a more adequate design of
labor market policy in a second step. Knowing about whether low employment probabilities are
due to qualification, statistical discrimination or other characteristics is crucial for designing labor
market policy. For example, subsidized jobs (whether in a competitive or non-competitive market)
are at least partly based on the belief that labor market disadvantages of long-term unemployed are
due to employer discrimination (low productivity signal) and that those jobs provide the necessary
skills to become permanently employed without any subsidies. Job search assistance programs
(counseling on increased search efforts and job search programs combined with benefit sanctioning)
assume job-seekers do not efficiently look for jobs but already possess the necessary human capital
skills demanded by the market. Training programs, in contrast, are designed in order to increase
human capital skills and qualification of unemployed and particularly long-term unemployed persons
necessary for employment.
In this paper, differences in the employability between short-term and long-term unemployed per-
sons are studied in order to reveal the crucial factors of job-finding chances regarding unemployment
duration in a comparative static way. The empirical analysis is based on unique survey data of short-
term and long-term unemployed persons merged with administrative data for Germany. These data
include usually unavailable information of job-seekers covering, e.g., soft skills, concessions the job-
1A practical application for Germany was conducted at the Institute for Employment Research during 2004 to
2006 titled with the acronym ‘TrEffeR’, i.e. Treatment Effects and Prediction. For a description see, e.g., Stephan,
Ra¨ssler, and Schewe (2006).
2It should be noted that most analyses considering the relation between health and labor supply focus on the
margin of taking people out of the labor force altogether. This may be a reason why these issues are not regarded
when studying the impacts of labor market programs. Nevertheless, it may be reasonable in this context to expect
effects of health or effects related to health.
3Put differently, even if the relevance of factors does not change over time due to dynamic selection of individuals
the corresponding effects may be obtained at later points of time only.
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seeker is willing to make for a new job, health and the time able to work a day, importance of
peers, self-assessed job finding chances and a set of obstacles for employment integration like fi-
nancial debts, care obligations for children or frail elderly or substance abuse including alcohol.
The employment gap of short-term and long-term unemployed is decomposed into explained and
unexplained differences using the group of short-term unemployed as a reference group represent-
ing high employability. Whereas the technique of decomposition has a long tradition to analyze
between-group differences dating back to the works of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), this is the
first application (to my knowledge) to analyze employability differences with the focus on recom-
mendations for the design of active labor market policy programs. Moreover, in order to study the
employability gap between short-term and long-term unemployed persons one has to take account
of the discrete nature of the outcome of interest, i.e. employment. This is considered by applying
the extension of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition by Fairlie (2005).
The results highlight three significant and important findings: First, differences in skills measured
by elementary skills, formal education and soft skills could explain a small part of the employment
gap between short-term and long-term unemployed persons only. Hence, providing courses that aim
at increasing skills of the individuals (at least in Germany) may reduce the employment gap, but the
scope is limited. Moreover, this may explain why training programs in Europe and particularly in
Germany are not more successful in employment integration of participants. Second, differences in
obstacles to employment measured in terms of substance abuse, financial debts or care obligations
are crucial. If long-term unemployed persons would be equal in characteristics to the short-term
unemployed, the employment gap between both groups would be clearly more narrow. Third,
differences in the state of health and in particular limitations in working ability account largely for
the employment gap. For this reason, policy makers should spend more attention on the last two
findings when designing the placement process. Moreover, the set of active labor market programs
should be revised addressing these aspects in order to increase employability of the participants.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a short description of active labor market
policy. The econometric methodology applied to the data to decompose the employability gap is
introduced in section 3. A description of the data including descriptive statistics of the sample is
presented in section 4. The empirical results are given in section 5. The final section concludes.
2 Active Labor Market Programs - A Short Description
A high and persistent unemployment in most OECD countries since the 1970 lead to a shift from
passive to active labor market policy. Active labor market programs comprise a range of policies
aimed at improving the access of the unemployed to the labor market and jobs, job-related skills and
the functioning of the labor market (Martin and Grubb, 2001). European countries mainly employ
four categories of activities, namely training covering measures intended to increase human capital
skills, private sector incentive schemes, e.g. start-up incentives, supported employment programs in
the public sector, and services and sanctions to improve job search efficiency (Kluve, 2006). Table 1
summarizes expenditures on a selection of labor market policy activities for a set of OECD countries
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in 2006. The figures indicate that countries differ in generosity. Whereas continental European
countries like Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, and Sweden pay more than 2 percent
of annual GDP on labor market policy, in Anglo-American countries the expenditures are below
1 percent. In addition, the figures obtain a different priority given to active measures. Whereas
the Scandinavian countries and the UK allocate a larger share of GDP to active than to passive
programs, the picture is reversed for the other countries and expenditures for passive measures are
almost twice that for active measures. With regards to the policy mix of active measures, most
continental European countries emphasize training programs over supported employment, direct
job creation, and start-up incentives programs.
Table 1: Public Expenditures on Labor Market Policy in Selected Countries (2006)a
Country
AUS Austria Belgium Canada France Germany Italy Norway Spain Sweden CH UK US
Programmes
PES and
administrationb
0.19 0.17 0.21 0.15 0.24 0.27 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.23 0.13 0.37 0.03
Training 0.01 0.40 0.20 0.08 0.29 0.33 0.22 0.26 0.16 0.33 0.23 0.02 0.05
Supported employ-
ment and rehabilita-
tion
0.05 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.20 0.23 0.01 0.03
Direct job creation 0.07 0.04 0.35 0.02 0.19 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Start-up incentives 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
Total 0.85 2.10 2.90 0.90 2.32 2.97 1.32 1.08 2.24 2.32 1.42 0.61 0.38
thereof
Active measures 0.34 0.71 1.09 0.31 0.92 0.88 0.53 0.58 0.80 1.36 0.67 0.42 0.14
Passive measures 0.50 1.39 1.81 0.60 1.39 2.09 0.79 0.50 1.43 0.96 0.75 0.19 0.24
a Public expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Source: OECD.Stat, web-resource
b PES = public employment services
Given the substantial expenditures accompanied by high unemployment resulted in concerns about
the effectiveness of the activities. For that reason, there are a considerable number of studies evalu-
ating the effects of the programs. However, deriving general conclusions is complicated as programs
(and program effects) differ by country and, thus, generalizing findings from one country for any
country is difficult. Comprehensive overviews on evaluation studies are given by Martin and Grubb
(2001) and Kluve (2006).4 With regards to the effectiveness, the overall picture is not very en-
couraging. Martin and Grubb (2001) conclude that only counseling and job search assistance with
increased monitoring, self-employment programs and hiring subsidies prove effectiveness. This con-
clusion is complemented by the results of Kluve (2006) conducting a meta-analysis that establishes
modest positive effects for training programs. In contrast, direct employment programs are rarely
effective and should be discontinued.
Germany provides a comprehensive system of labor market policy consisting of generous passive
measures and a large number of active measures. Passive measures comprise unemployment ben-
efits (Arbeitslosengeld, UB) and welfare benefits (Arbeitslosengeld II ).5 The major programs of
4In addition, an extensive discussion of the methodological issues for program evaluation is provided by Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith (1999).
5Eligibility for unemployment benefits is given if a person has been employed subject to social security contributions
for at least six months. In case of unemployment, persons receive unemployment benefits for a limited period of at
maximum 12 months (and 18 months for older workers) conditional on the duration of the preceding contribution pe-
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the active measures are training, job search assistance programs, subsidized employment in public
sector, programs aimed at integration in private sector (wage subsidies, loans to employers) and
public employment services.6 Each group of programs focusses on certain barriers to employment.
Training programs, for example, should provide necessary human capital skills, subsidized jobs are
intended to maintain the employability of the unemployed and improve the work experience. Job
search activities should be encouraged by job search assistance programs combined with intensified
monitoring and benefit sanctions.7 Despite the variety of programs, problems potentially hampering
employment integration like sickness, or substance abuse, financial debts, and care obligations are
regarded marginally only. Programs have different eligibility criteria but in general job-seekers have
to be entitled to unemployment or welfare benefits. Participation in active labor market programs
is compulsory only if persons are referred to by the employment agency. While in the program
persons are required to continue searching for a job.
How comparable is Germany’s labor market policy to that of other countries? Despite the fact
that many countries use similar programs, characteristics of the placement process are important
for generalizing the findings.8 As in Germany, in most countries registration at the employment
agency is a precondition for placement and is followed by an intensive interview and an evaluation
of an individual action plan. Moreover, requiring job seekers to report job search efforts frequently
is common to most systems. With regards to participation in active labor market programs, only a
small number of countries differ from the German system imposing compulsory participation after a
certain duration of unemployment (Australia, Denmark, Sweden, UK). Continuing job search during
participation is not required in many countries but Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany,
New Zealand, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland and the US force participants to do so. All
in all, Germany’s labor market policy could be assessed to be similar to that of most other OECD
countries. For that reason, analyzing the determinants of the employability gap using German data
may provide general conclusion for the (re-)arrangement of active labor market programs.
riod to unemployment insurance. Unemployment benefits amount to about 60 (67) percent (for people with dependent
children) of the net income in the last month before unemployment paid from unemployment insurance. Eligibility
for welfare benefits is fulfilled if the person is able to work and has no claims for unemployment benefits. This is the
case for example for self-employed who in general do not contribute to unemployment insurance, for persons who have
not worked in the past as well as for persons whose unemployment benefit claims have expired. Provision of welfare
benefits is means-tested, i.e. it depends on the capital and earnings of the individual. Payments are funded from
taxes. Welfare recipients receive a lump-sum payment of 347 Euro (345 Euro until 2007) per month and maintenance
allowances covering cost of lodging. Welfare benefits are, in general, paid on infinite time horizon until retirement
age, but employment officers should force the recipients to get employed. If direct integration into employment is not
possible, welfare benefit recipients could be assigned to various active labor market policy programs. The majority of
these programs is available for short-term and long-term unemployed persons as well.
6A description of Germany’s active labor market programs is given in Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit (2007, Part II.E).
7Programs have been evaluated in a number of recent studies. E.g., Hujer, Thomsen, and Zeiss (2006b), Lechner
and Wunsch (2008), and Biewen, Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Waller (2006) analyze the effects of training programs.
Thomsen (2007) provides an extensive analysis of subsidized employment in Germany. Job search assistance programs
have been studied by Hujer, Thomsen, and Zeiss (2006a) and Lechner and Wunsch (2008).
8OECD (2007b, Chapter 5) summarizes important characteristics essential to the placement process in 29 OECD
countries. See also the further extended materials in OECD (2007a).
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3 Methodology
To estimate the underlying causes for different employment chances of short- and long-term unem-
ployed, it is reasonable to identify differences due to characteristics of the two groups (endowments)
and differences due to different effects of the endowments (coefficients) separately. When outcomes
of interest could be estimated by linear regression (e.g. wages), a common approach is the decom-
position of the effects in the average value of a dependent variable Y as suggested by Oaxaca (1973)
and Blinder (1973) that could be expressed by
Y¯ s − Y¯ l =
[
(X¯s − X¯ l)βˆs
]
+
[
X¯ l(βˆs − βˆl)
]
, (1)
where Y¯ s(Y¯ l) is the average outcome for the short-term (long-term) unemployed. Let X¯j be a row
vector of the average values of the independent variables and βˆj the vector of coefficient estimates
for group j with j ∈ {s, l} (with s denoting short-term unemployed and l denoting long-term
unemployed persons in the case at hand). The first term on the right-hand side captures differences
in the outcome due to characteristics, the second term are differences in coefficients capturing the
‘price’ of the characteristics. This term also includes the contribution of the difference in outcomes
due to unobserved or unmeasurable endowments.
However, if the outcome of interest is binary, e.g. employment, and estimation of the outcome
equations within each of the groups is based on a non-linear technique, e.g. probit or logit model,
decomposing differences in means is not feasible. For that case, Fairlie (2005) suggests a decompo-
sition technique that extends the Oaxaca-Blinder-technique to the discrete case9:
Y¯ s − Y¯ l =
 Ns∑
i=1
F (Xsi βˆ
s)
N s
−
N l∑
i=1
F (X li βˆ
s)
N l
+
 N l∑
i=1
F (X li βˆ
s)
N l
−
N l∑
i=1
F (X li βˆ
l)
N l
 , (2)
with N j denoting the sample size of group j. With Y¯ j as the average employment probability
of group j and F (·) as the cumulative distribution function from the logistic distribution, eq. 2
holds exactly for a logit model including a constant term (Fairlie, 2005). In this specification, the
coefficient estimates for the employment probability of the short-term unemployed (βˆs) are used
as weights for the differences due to characteristics. The short-term unemployed distributions of
the independent variables (X¯s) are the weights for the differences in coefficients. Alternatively, the
employment probability gap between short- and long-term unemployed persons could be decomposed
by
Y¯ s − Y¯ l =
 Ns∑
i=1
F (Xsi βˆ
l)
N s
−
N l∑
i=1
F (X li βˆ
l)
N l
+ [ Ns∑
i=1
F (Xsi βˆ
s)
N l
−
Ns∑
i=1
F (Xsi βˆ
l)
N s
]
. (3)
Here, the estimated coefficients and distribution of the independent variables of the long-term un-
employed are used as weights for the two decomposition terms. Estimating the decomposition
according to eq. 2 can lead to different parameter estimates than estimation by eq. 3. Unfortu-
nately, as shown by Oaxaca and Ransom (1994), the actual nondiscriminatory structure should
9Besides Fairlie (2005), there are a number extensions of the technique of decomposition proposed in the literature.
An early example is given by Gomulka and Stern (1990). More recently Yun (2004; 2005) suggests a generalization of
the Oaxaca (1973)-Blinder (1973)-decomposition for any functional form of the outcome equation.
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not necessarily lie between the short-term and the long-term structure of the estimates. Hence,
Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) suggest to weight the first term of the decomposition using coefficient
estimates from a pooled model of all short-term and long-term unemployed persons. This weight
allows to estimate the employment probability of the individuals that would exist in the absence of
unmeasurable differences.
Besides the total contribution of all independent variables to the gap in employment probabilities
as given by eq. 2 and eq. 3, contributions of single independent variables or groups of variables are
of interest for policy purposes. Following Fairlie (2005), the contribution of a single variable X1
(with βˆ∗ denoting the coefficient from a logit model on the pooled sample) is given by
1
N l
N l∑
i=1
[
F (αˆ∗ +Xs1iβˆ
∗
1 +X
s
2iβˆ
∗
2)− F (αˆ∗ +X l1iβˆ∗1 +Xs2iβˆ∗2)
]
(4)
if Ns = Nl and a natural one-to-one matching of short-term and long-term unemployed observations
is assumed. X2 contains all variables in X except X1. Each variable contributes to the gap in terms
of the change in the average predicted probability from replacing the distribution of the long-term
unemployed with that of the short-term unemployed of that variable holding the other variables
constant. It should be noted that the independent contributions of the variables depend on the
values of the other variables. Hence, estimates of the employment gap may be sensitive to the
choice of the variables. In sum, contributions from individual variables have to be equal to the total
contribution from all variables.
Table 2: Estimation Procedure
Step Description
1. Calculate predicted probabilities Yˆi base on pooled coef-
ficient estimates for each observation in long-term unem-
ployment and short-term unemployment sample
2. Draw random sub-sample of the larger sample equal in
size to the smaller sample
3. Rank observations according to predicted probability Yˆi
separately in both samples
4. Match individuals on predicted probabilities
5. Calculate the decompositions estimates
6. Repeat steps 1 to 6 for numerous times (e.g. 1000) ran-
domizing the order of variables in step 1
7. Calculate the mean value of the estimates from the sepa-
rate decompositions in step 5
However, if sample sizes of the two groups in comparison differ the one-to-one matching of observa-
tions has to be replicated. To do so, a random sub-sample of the larger group in comparison should
be drawn equal in size to the smaller group. Then, the individual calculated predicted probabilities
from the pooled model are ranked separately and observations are matched by ranks. Decomposi-
tion estimates are obtained based on the matched sample. These estimates clearly depend on the
random sub-sample. To get an estimate for the hypothetical decomposition I repeat the procedure
1,000 times and use the mean value of the estimates as the results for the entire larger sample. Table
7
2 summarizes the steps of the estimation procedure. Finally, because of the non-linearity of the
decomposition the ordering of the variables could affect the results. For this reason, in addition to
randomizing the sort order of the individuals the order of the explanatory variables is randomized
in the estimation as well.
4 Data
The empirical analysis is based on merged register and survey data of short- and long-term unem-
ployed persons in Germany. Information was collected in computer-assisted telephone interviews
in September and October 2006. Data were completed by information merged from register data
providing the employment states in February 2007.10 The original sample contained 3,841 equally
shared short- and long-term unemployed persons in August 2006. To consider urban and rural re-
gions in East and West Germany a geographical stratification was imposed. Only people aged 18 to
57 were regarded in the survey. People aged 58 could choose a so-called relaxed benefit entitlement.
Within this scheme they are no more required to actively search for employment, but could remain
on welfare benefits until retirement age. A further precondition on the sample is work ability. All
persons, independently if short-term or long-term unemployed were registered as work able and
available to the labor market at the employment agencies. For this reason, every person in the
sample could be expected to get employed.
The survey’s purpose was the measuring of individual’s employability as an intermediate outcome of
employment. For this reason, the data provide a rich and comprehensive characterization of the un-
employed person’s labor market and social situation. Besides this, from register data information on
age, region, level of education and employment state is added. The questionnaire of the proprietary
survey contains 48 questions that could be categorized by content in the following categories.
(i) Labor market state and employment history: Questions of this category comprise, e.g.,
the duration of unemployment (in categories), labor market state before actual unemployment,
and the type of benefits received. The information of this category is used to distinguish short-
term and long-term unemployed persons in the empirical analysis, where long-term refers to
a duration of unemployment of more than 12 months.
(ii) Skills: Self-assessed information on elementary skills, e.g., reading and writing ability, calcu-
lating, internet knowledge are measured in grades ranging from 1 (very good) to 6 (insufficient).
For the analysis, these variables have been recoded to three grades (poor/sufficient/good).
Moreover, the level of formal education is considered in three classes (low/medium/high).
Soft skills comprise willingness to learn, accuracy in working behavior and capacity for team-
work, besides others. Information on personality measures whether the individual is socially
integrated or is willing to take responsibility for actions.
10The data were collected within a project on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Employment. Due to legal
restrictions register information on employment states is available for February 2007 only. The project was finalized
in 2007 making amendments of the data impossible. Nevertheless, the available information enables a decomposition
of employability determinants in the medium-run, i.e. six months after the interview.
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(iii) Obstacles to employment: Questions of this category address whether integration into
employment is hampered due to care obligations for children or frail elderly, substance abuse
(including alcohol), or financial debts. Whereas care obligations or substance abuse diminish
the employment chances due to limitations of time or health, financial debts of persons provide
an obstacle to employment if persons expect a common garnishment of wages when working.
In that case, expected utility of work may be smaller than that of unemployment leading to
an increase of unemployment duration. To mitigate this problem, the German legislator offers
a personal bankruptcy scheme. In this scheme, persons have to defer a pre-defined amount
of their income for a period of six years. The sum of this deferral is below the debts of the
individual. After that time they are clear of debts.
(iv) Health conditions: Characteristics are surveyed in terms of the actual state of health,
certain health limitations and the amount of hours the person is able to work per day (as a
categorical variable).
(v) Labor market orientation: This category summarizes statements on work orientation and
motivation. In one question, people should assess the chances of finding a suitable job with
answers in four categories ranging from very likely to very unlikely. The answer scheme of
this question is of particular importance for analyzing the employment gap between short-
term and long-term unemployed persons as it conveys usually unobservable information of the
individual. Persons may have quite realistic expectations about their situation and their job
finding chances on average, i.e. even in the group of long-term unemployed there may be a
sub-group with good job finding prospects that actually anticipates the situation. Ignoring
anticipation may lead to biased estimates as observed employment rates are due to a different
distribution of persons reporting good and bad chances in the groups of short-term and long-
term unemployed (see, e.g., van den Berg, 2001). In the empirical analysis, a binary variable
indicating good job chances (people report finding a job is likely or very likely) is regarded
as an additional regressor capturing usually unobservable information about motivation, self-
assessed marketability, work habits and self-esteem of the individual to remove the problem
of selection on unobservable variables.
(vi) Job search efforts and concessions to new job: Variables of this category cover difficulties
in job search, the number of job applications, contact to the employment agency during the
last six months, and the types of job search channels, e.g., reading job advertisements in
newspaper or writing unsolicited applications. Examples for the types of concessions asked in
the questionnaire are whether the person is willing to accept a significantly lower wage than
in the last job, i.e. a wage about 20 percent below the last wage, to commute for up to 1.5
hours to the new working place and to accept a job below the individual’s qualification.
(vii) Social stability: The situation of the individual within her social environment and her
peer-group is described by items like job loss occurred due to social instability, the size of the
peer-group (knowledge of other unemployed persons in a similar situation) or support received
from the employment agency to mitigate problems.
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(viii) Experiences with activation by employment agency: People are asked about their
experiences with the caseworker and the job search process organized and administered by
the agency. Variables included in this category cover the imposition of benefit sanctions and
a participation in several types of active labor market programs.
(ix) Socio-demographic information: In this category information on gender, age, and the
number of persons living in the household is available.
Some restrictions on the data have to be imposed for the empirical analysis. To decompose the
employability gap in order to identify determinants of employment and using these results for rec-
ommendations on the use and set-up of active labor market programs, the problem of potentially
endogenous variables has to be considered. Endogenous variables may lead to biased estimates as
they are likely to be not policy invariant or not causal for employment. For that reason, not all of
the variables described above could be used in the estimation, e.g., the number of job applications
or the number of job search channels employed (that are expected to be time-variant and could be
affected by the caseworker). In an ideal case, employment probabilities of short-term and long-term
unemployed persons would be decomposed without any active labor market program at all. Unfor-
tunately, the real world looks different and a significant share of persons participate in a program
during the unemployment spell, see Table 3. Moreover, the results show that the probability of par-
ticipation increases with unemployment duration. In that context it has to be noted that addressing
the complex variety of different active labor market programs in Germany is not feasible in a survey.
Therefore, people were asked about the type of activity provided. These categories comprise, e.g.,
vocational training courses, self-employment or subsidized employment. For that reason, reported
participation may not compellingly correspond to the programs offered by the Federal Employment
Agency and shares denoted may exceed official figures. To avoid biased estimates, persons with
active labor market participation are removed from the analysis.
Table 3: Shares of Persons with Participation in Different Active Labor Market Programsa
Men Women
Short-
term
Unem-
ployed
Long-
term
Unem-
ployed
p-valueb Short-
term
Unem-
ployed
Long-
term
Unem-
ployed
p-valueb
Benefit sanctions 0.131 0.147 0.313 0.087 0.116 0.045
Vocational training 0.185 0.281 0.000 0.200 0.244 0.028
Support for self-employment 0.075 0.041 0.001 0.043 0.031 0.187
Subsidized employment 0.092 0.374 0.000 0.058 0.330 0.000
a It has to be noted that multiple participation of persons is possible. Information refers to period before interview.
b p-value from t-test on equality of means of variable for short-term and long-term unemployed.
A similar issue relates to provisions for those among the unemployed who are sick, who have trouble
with substance abuse, or have care responsibilities at home. However, although employment agencies
could offer support in these cases, caseworkers intervene much more infrequently. Table 4 provides
a cross-tabulation of self-reported obstacles to employment and whether or not the person received
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support from the employment agency in absolute numbers of the original sample. The results
show that the number of persons reporting problems in any of the three categories is higher than
the number of cases where these issues are addressed. Moreover, provision of support does not
necessarily correlate highly to the needs reported by the individual. Whereas the latter finding may
be partly induced by a different perception on side of the caseworker, the former indicates scope
or requirement for an expansion of these activities. Given the relatively small share of persons
reporting problems compared to persons receiving active labor market programs problems a lack of
places available could be expected of minor importance only. Again, to allow consistent estimation
persons receiving support from the employment agency are excluded from the analysis.
Table 4: Obstacles to Employmenta
Men Women
Short-term
Unemployed
Long-term
Unemployed
Short-term
Unemployed
Long-term
Unemployed
Support received from employment agency
no yes total no yes total no yes total no yes total
Financial debts no 1,171 22 1,193 740 26 766 940 14 954 718 20 738
yes 35 5 40 85 7 92 17 4 21 33 4 37
Substance abuse no 1,181 12 1,193 769 13 782 940 6 946 708 8 716
yes 36 4 40 75 1 76 27 2 29 57 2 59
Care obligation no 1,115 17 1,132 773 20 793 807 17 824 559 22 581
yes 99 2 101 61 4 65 147 4 151 184 10 194
a Table provides cross-tabulation of self-reported obstacle to employment (due to finan-
cial debts, substance abuse and care obligation) and support received from employment
agency with respect to the respective type of obstacle. Total denote row sum of persons
reporting the respective obstacle.
To describe the remaining sample for the analysis, Table 5 compares means of selected variables
between short-term and long-term unemployed persons. In addition, p-values of t-tests on equality
are added to allow for a meaningful discussion of differences. The first thing to note it that em-
ployment integration about six months after the interview differs significantly between short-term
and long-term unemployed persons independently of gender, where long-term unemployed are worse
off. With regards to gender, women experience lower employment rates than men. Regarding the
characteristics covering skills (soft skills, education, and elementary skills) shows that men with
different unemployment durations are more homogeneous a group than women. Soft skills do not
differ much independently of gender but long-term unemployed men possess lower soft-skills, i.e. ca-
pacity for teamwork or working accuracy. With regards to formal education, long-term unemployed
women tend to have a lower education. Considering elementary skills reveals a similar pattern. In
contrast, men with different unemployment durations only differ slightly in these aspects. For the
remaining characteristics comprising personality, experience and network, obstacles to employment,
health, working ability, and concessions for a new job differences in means are similar for men and
women. The results show less favorable characteristics of the long-term unemployed. However, the
question to be answered is in how much these differences account for different employment chances.
This will be analyzed in the next section.
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Table 5: Means of Selected Variables
Men Women
Short-
term
Unem-
ployed
Long-
term
Unem-
ployed
p-valuea Short-
term
Unem-
ployed
Long-
term
Unem-
ployed
p-valuea
employmentb 0.318 0.097 0.000 0.245 0.067 0.000
Soft skills
capacity for teamwork 0.976 0.934 0.001 0.980 0.960 0.077
learning aptitude 0.953 0.924 0.074 0.960 0.957 0.801
working accuracy 0.981 0.958 0.045 0.987 0.977 0.265
Education
low-skilled 0.487 0.550 0.074 0.446 0.543 0.006
medium-skilled 0.362 0.336 0.435 0.439 0.363 0.029
high-skilled 0.151 0.114 0.135 0.114 0.093 0.335
Elementary skills
reading (satisfactory) 0.157 0.190 0.198 0.080 0.133 0.010
reading (good) 0.836 0.772 0.018 0.917 0.863 0.011
writing (satisfactory) 0.294 0.304 0.743 0.186 0.227 0.147
writing (good) 0.694 0.661 0.308 0.811 0.747 0.026
calculating (satisfactory) 0.273 0.326 0.096 0.347 0.406 0.082
calculating (good) 0.716 0.649 0.038 0.635 0.564 0.039
internet (satisfactory) 0.272 0.291 0.549 0.240 0.303 0.043
internet (good) 0.552 0.412 0.000 0.536 0.357 0.000
Personality
responsibility 0.976 0.938 0.003 0.983 0.967 0.107
socially integrated 0.789 0.664 0.000 0.794 0.683 0.000
Experience and network
work experience 0.775 0.668 0.000 0.748 0.547 0.000
social network 0.612 0.457 0.000 0.592 0.507 0.015
Obstacles to employment
substance abuse 0.013 0.059 0.000 0.020 0.057 0.003
financial debts 0.031 0.111 0.000 0.012 0.053 0.000
care obligations 0.077 0.069 0.681 0.167 0.250 0.003
Health
health (poor) 0.064 0.190 0.000 0.085 0.193 0.000
health (satisfactory) 0.207 0.266 0.042 0.186 0.263 0.007
health (good) 0.730 0.543 0.000 0.730 0.543 0.000
Working ability
less than 3 hours 0.001 0.035 0.000 0.010 0.027 0.056
3 to 6 hours 0.018 0.090 0.000 0.085 0.183 0.000
6 to 8 hours 0.069 0.111 0.032 0.191 0.263 0.012
8 and more hours 0.911 0.765 0.000 0.715 0.527 0.000
Concessions for a new job
workplace far away 0.533 0.595 0.077 0.408 0.473 0.062
job below (formal) qualification 0.743 0.851 0.000 0.824 0.887 0.015
change of occupation 0.388 0.394 0.862 0.272 0.273 0.966
significantly lower wage than last job 0.238 0.433 0.000 0.240 0.433 0.000
Socio-demographics
no. of persons in household 2.498 2.519 0.930 2.692 2.823 0.691
18 to 24 years 0.112 0.028 0.000 0.123 0.043 0.000
25 to 34 years 0.248 0.253 0.884 0.250 0.237 0.652
35 to 44 years 0.297 0.277 0.530 0.282 0.303 0.504
45 to 57 years 0.343 0.443 0.003 0.345 0.417 0.035
Regions
West Germany, urban 0.248 0.273 0.411 0.270 0.253 0.586
West Germany, rural 0.214 0.211 0.914 0.224 0.253 0.325
East Germany, urban 0.281 0.239 0.179 0.270 0.240 0.329
East Germany, rural 0.257 0.277 0.523 0.235 0.253 0.556
Self-assessed job chances
Good job chances 0.217 0.052 0.000 0.192 0.053 0.000
No. of observations 677 603 289 300
a p-value from t-test on equality of means of variable for short-term and long-term unemployed.
b Employment in February 2007.
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5 Estimation Results
According to the differences between groups revealed above, estimation of the determinants of the
employability gap is carried out in five separate decompositions. In the first decomposition the
employment gap between short-term and long-term unemployed persons is analyzed in the full
sample, i.e. men and women are pooled with an intercept to distinguish gender effects. However,
employment probabilities of men and women could be expected to differ. Therefore, I decompose
the gap separately for men (decomposition two) and women (decomposition three). Based on
these three decompositions the central question of the paper is answered. In addition, two further
estimations decomposing the employability gaps of women and men for short-term unemployed
(decomposition four) and long-term unemployed (decomposition five) are added in order to test the
model specification, i.e. whether the variables included are able to explain the employability gap.
Table 6 provides the results of the decomposition of the employment gap for the five groups. The
upper panel of the table shows the employment rates for the distinct groups in comparison where
group 1 refers to the short-term unemployed (models 1 to 3) or men (4 and 5).11 In addition, the
difference in job finding chances is given as well as the part that could be explained by differences
in attributes. In the whole sample, about 28 percent of the short-term unemployed persons have
found a job within six months after the interview compared to about 8 percent of the long-term
unemployed. In consequence, the gap in employment chances amounts to about 20 percent. With
regards to gender the employment gaps amount to about 18 percentage points for women and 22
percentage points for men. All in all, about 32 percent of the gap for men and about 37 percent of
the gap for women could be explained by differences in endowments. The remaining differences are
due to a different valuing of the attributes. One reason for this different valuing may be statistical
discrimination by potential employers. However, as it is impossible to interpret these price effects of
characteristics in a sensible manner, the discussion concentrates on the differences in endowments.
The lower panel provides contributions to the employability gap from the explanatory variables.
Below the coefficient estimates the contributions in percent are given for ease of interpretation. To
abbreviate presentation, the effects of similar characteristics are summarized. Obviously, one would
expect long-term unemployed to possess a lower qualification and, hence, a lower productivity com-
pared to short-term unemployed which could be a reason for the longer unemployment duration.
Policy makers therefore spend a large amount of the annual budget for labor market policy on train-
ing courses intended to increase the human capital skills of the individuals. Empirical evaluations of
the programs have shown that their value in regards to increased employment chances and sustain-
able employment is not without doubt at least for Germany (see, e.g., Hujer, Thomsen, and Zeiss,
2006, or Lechner and Wunsch, 2008 for Germany, and Martin and Grubb, 2001, or Kluve, 2006, for
a summary on international experiences). A reason for the unsatisfactory effects of the programs
could be derived from the estimates here. Although short-term and long-term unemployed persons
differ in elementary skills (reading, calculating and internet) and (formal) education (medium- and
high-skilled), these differences could explain only a small fraction of the difference in the gap of job
11Table A.1 in the Appendix provides the estimates of the logit models on employment for the five decompositions.
13
Table 6: Non-linear Decomposition of the Employment Gap
Full Sample Men Women Short-term
Unemployed
Long-term
Unemployed
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
% expl. % expl. % expl. % expl. % expl.
Employment (group 1) 0.2836 0.3176 0.2454 0.3176 0.0972
Employment (group 2) 0.0819 0.0972 0.0671 0.2454 0.0671
Difference 0.2017 0.2204 0.1783 0.0721 0.0301
Total explained 0.0780 0.0704 0.0662 0.0718 0.0369
38.68% 31.96% 37.11% 99.53% 122.70%
Contributions from differences ina
Soft skills 0.0047*** 0.0092** 0.0017 -0.0011 0.0037
2.31% 4.17% 0.96% -1.55% 12.17%
Elementary skills 0.0062 -0.0002 0.0124** 0.0062 0.0109
3.09% -0.09% 6.94% 8.61% 36.18%
Education 0.0026 0.0049* 0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0021
1.29% 2.20% 0.94% -2.09% -7.01%
Personality 0.0009 0.0010 0.0002 0.0001 0.0022*
0.45% 0.47% 0.13% 0.13% 7.16%
Work experience and 0.0109** 0.0137** 0.0089 0.0018* 0.0012
social network 5.39% 6.20% 4.98% 2.43% 3.90%
Substance abuse 0.0046** 0.0050 – 0.0005 –
2.28% 2.29% – 0.67% –
Financial debts 0.0034 0.0082 -0.0016 -0.0009 -0.0009
1.69% 3.70% -0.91% -1.29% -2.92%
Care obligation 0.0048*** -0.0004 0.0109*** 0.0090*** 0.0119
2.39% -0.19% 6.13% 12.41% 39.60%
Health 0.0081* 0.0075 0.0090 0.0008 -0.0013
4.01% 3.39% 5.06% 1.12% -4.20%
Work ability
less than 6 hours 0.0089*** – 0.0062 0.0062** 0.0057**
4.41% – 3.46% 8.65% 18.98%
6 to 8 hours 0.0083*** 0.0042* 0.0092** 0.0129*** 0.0086
4.10% 1.89% 5.16% 17.83% 28.71%
Concessions for new job 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0018 -0.0045 0.0021
0.08% 0.36% -1.00% -6.25% 6.99%
No. of persons in hh 0.0031 0.0068 0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0030
1.55% 3.09% 0.68% -2.04% -9.92%
Age 0.0020 -0.0032 0.0064 -0.0003 0.0005
0.99% -1.43% 3.61% -0.41% 1.55%
Region -0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0013
-0.31% -0.57% -0.18% -0.55% -4.43%
Good job chances 0.0083* 0.0142* 0.0019 0.0020** –
4.14% 6.43% 1.09% 2.81% –
Women 0.0015 – – 0.0425 -0.0012
0.77% – – 58.97% -3.87%
a Contribution estimates are mean values of the decomposition using 1,000 subsamples of group 1
in each comparison. See text for details. Estimation was carried out with FAIRLIE module by
Jann (2007).
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
finding rates. In the full sample, only about 1.29 percent of the gap are explained by differences
in education and another 3.09 percent by differences in elementary skills. Moreover, educational
differences play a role for the long-term unemployed men, but not for women. In elementary skills,
the picture is reversed with respect to gender. These results clarify that the focus of active labor
market policy on reducing these deficits for long-term unemployed persons with training programs
could increase the employment chances only slightly. This could, at least in part, explain why vo-
cational training programs in Germany are not more successful in integrating unemployed persons
into the labor market. In addition, observed differences in soft skills (capacity of teamwork and
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learning aptitude) do not contribute to the employability gap either, i.e. actual job finding chances
are not lower for long-term unemployed persons due the lower level of soft skills they possess.
Differences in work experience and the size of the social network explain further 5.39 percent (full
sample) of the gap. This result is stable for both gender (6.20 percent for men, 4.98 percent for
women). According to theory, work experience constitutes an important part of human capital
skills. In addition, the size of the network is relevant for job finding as many workers find jobs
through relatives or friends (see, e.g., Montgomery, 1991). With respect to active labor market
programs this results indicate that increasing work experience of the unemployed should be posi-
tively correlated with employment probability. In that manner, subsidized employment programs
are offered in many countries providing opportunities to gain experience for unemployed persons.
However, recommending a use of these programs from the result requires a look on existing evalu-
ations of those programs. Two types of subsidized employment could be distinguished: on the one
hand, programs in private firms, on the other hand, programs in public or non-profit institutions.
Empirical evaluations show that both types coincide with certain problems. Whereas subsidized
programs in private firms could have positive effects in terms of employment chances for the in-
dividual (see, e.g., Forslund, Johansson, and Lindqvist, 2004, for Sweden or Rosholm and Svarer,
2004, for Denmark), they could impose deadweight losses when hirings from the target group would
have occurred even in the absence of the program or substitution effects if jobs created for a certain
category of workers simply replace jobs in other (regular) categories (Calmfors, 1994). To avoid
these negative effects, Germany for example allows subsidized employment in private firms under
rigorous conditions only, and the vast majority of subsidized jobs is provided in the non-market
sector. A drawback of these jobs is that skills and work experience provided are unequal to that of
private jobs as activities accomplished are not demanded by the market. In line with that, evalua-
tions of the effects draw a disappointing picture with respect to employment integration (see, e.g.
Thomsen, 2007, for Germany or Lorentzen and Dahl, 2005, for Norway).
Employment agencies already try to substitute missing social networks by provision of activities like
job search monitoring or intensive counseling. If successfully imitating the virtue of social networks,
these programs could decrease the employability gap between both groups and, therefore, raise the
employment chances of the long-term unemployed. As these programs are less expensive compared
to traditional training courses, they could provide a cost-effective means to reduce unemployment.
In line with that, a number of studies have validated positive effects of these programs, for example
Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir, and van Reenen (2004) for the UK, Cre´pon, Dejemeppe, and Gurgand
(2005) for France or Hujer, Thomsen, and Zeiss (2006a) for Germany.
Compared to differences in skills, differences with respect to characteristics appointing obstacles
to employment (substance abuse, financial debts, care obligations) account for a larger part of the
employability gap. Summing up the single contributions of the variables in this category explains
about 6.36 percent in the full sample. This means that if long-term unemployed had the same
amount of obstacles to employment as the short-term unemployed this would reduce the employment
gap of 20.17 percent by about 1.28 percentage points which is more than twice eliminating differences
in elementary skills. Among the characteristics in this group, care obligations for children or frail
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elderly contribute largest to the gap, followed by substance abuse (including alcohol) and financial
debts (that are significant only in the full sample). The separate decompositions by gender show
some heterogeneity. Whereas care obligations do not play a role for men they are very important
for women. In addition, a large part of the gap for men could be explained by financial debts.
As noted above, financial debts could hamper employment integration if persons expect a common
garnishment of their wages. Substance abuse (including alcohol) is not relevant for women but
all the more for men. These findings are very important since active labor market programs do
rarely (if at all) take account of these issues. As shown above, only a small fraction of persons
receives support from employment agencies with these problems. The estimates provide empirical
evidence that spending more attention on these aspects and providing activities that mitigate the
level or circumvent that these problems constitute over the unemployment spell would reduce the
employment gap between short-term and long-term unemployed significantly.
Furthermore, differences in health conditions comprising the ability to work a full day determine
12.52 percent (full sample), 5.28 percent (men) and 1.38 percent (women) of the gap. That means
that if long-term unemployed were equal in health and working ability to the short-term unemployed
the employment gap of 20.17 percent would be 2.53 percentage points narrowed. Whereas the state
of health is important for men, differences in work ability explain the majority of the gap for
women with a clearly larger contribution than that of skills or education. Health conditions and
working ability are crucial for job finding chances. Compared to the differences in elementary
skills and education, health differences and differences in the working ability are more important
and policy makers should focus on programs improving the physical (and mental) health of the
unemployed in order to increase employment chances. A reason for the work ability problems for
women may be a lack of part-time jobs and of jobs with flexible working hours. Thus, creating
more flexible jobs and/or mitigating care obligations for women could reduce the gap. In light with
the dissatisfying outcomes of many active labor market programs aiming to improve human capital
skills, a reorganization of the activities may be arranged at no increase of costs.
The number of persons living in the household (persons in household, persons in household squared)
explains some part of the gap for men. Moreover, an age (age groups) effect could be established for
women. Independently of gender differences between long-term and short-term unemployed persons
in regards to personality (responsibility, social integration) or willingness to make concessions for
a new job (work place far away, job below formal qualification, change of occupation, lower wage)
do not affect the probability of getting a job. Improving those aspects, therefore, will imply hardly
any effect. Finally, models 4 and 5 have been estimated to provide a check of the explanatory
power of the model when time effects are eliminated. Independently of unemployment duration the
variables included in the model are able to explain the variation in the outcomes almost perfectly.
The largest part is explained by gender differences or attributes that correlate with these differences
(care obligations, differences in elementary skills, or work ability).
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6 Conclusion
To lower the risk of long-term unemployment and to reduce the level of unemployment governments
in many OECD countries offer various active labor market policy programs. However, evaluations
of the effects of these programs have shown that the majority of the activities lead to at best
modest positive effects for the participating individuals. There are a number of possible reasons for
this unsatisfying result. Programs could be regarded as negative signals of productivity, duration of
programs could be too long and so-called locking-in effects overcompensate positive program effects,
or placement of job-seekers to available programs could be inefficient. Indeed, as a further reason
programs’ effectiveness could suffer from inadequate design to meet the needs of the job-seekers.
The aim of this paper was to identify job-seekers’ needs conditional on the job-finding chances.
Knowing about the determinants of employability differences between short-term and long-term
unemployed persons could help to (re-)arrange programs concentrating on factors of crucial relevance
for labor market success. Having access to unique information including usually unobservable
items like self-reported job chances, substance abuse, financial debts, care obligations, limitations
of working ability of the job-seeker the employment gap has been decomposed into effects due to
differences in endowments and effects due to a different valuing of these differences.
The results show that skill differences are an important source of the employment gap but the
scope of increasing the employment chances of long-term unemployed by increasing human capital
is limited. This is in line with the empirical findings on the effects of vocational training programs
that show negative or at best small positive employment effects for the participating individuals,
see e.g. Hujer, Thomsen, and Zeiss (2006b) or Lechner and Wunsch (2008).
Far more relevant for the differences in employment between short-term and long-term unemployed
persons are differences in terms of obstacles to employment like substance abuse, financial debts
or care obligations for children or frail elderly. Reducing the problem in the group of long-term
unemployed persons or circumvention of the formation of these problems over the unemployment
spell could reduce the difference in employment, and, thus, increase the employment chances of
the long-term unemployed. A further important finding refers to state of health and differences in
the working ability of the groups. Mitigating the differences in these characteristics between both
groups by offering programs intended to improve physical and/or mental health and creating jobs
with flexible working times could narrow the employment gap as well. Up to now, however, these
latter aspects are only marginally (if at all) regarded within the placement process in many countries.
Revising the goal and purpose of active labor market programs with an explicit consideration of
these findings, therefore, could be expected to be of value for employment integration of unemployed
persons and reducing the number of long-term unemployed people.
References
Bartel, A., and P. Taubman (1979): “Health and Labor Market Success: The Role of Various
Diseases,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 61(1), 1–8.
17
Berger, M. C., D. Black, and J. A. Smith (2001): “Evaluating Profiling as a Means of Al-
locating Government Services,” in Econometric Evaluation of Labour Market Policies, ed. by
M. Lechner, and F. Pfeiffer, vol. 13 of ZEW Economic Studies, pp. 59–84. Physica-Verlag, Hei-
delberg.
Biewen, M., B. Fitzenberger, A. Osikominu, and M. Waller (2006): “Employment Effects
of Short and Medium Term Further Training Programmes in Germany in the Early 2000s,”
Working Paper, Goethe University Frankfurt.
Blinder, A. S. (1973): “Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Variables,” Journal
of Human Resources, 8, 436–455.
Blundell, R., M. Costa Dias, C. Meghir, and J. van Reenen (2004): “Evaluating the
Employment Impact of a Mandatory Job Search Assistance Program,” Journal of the European
Economic Association, 2(4).
Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit (2007): Arbeitsmarkt 2006 vol. 55 of Amtliche Nachrichten der Bunde-
sagentur fu¨r Arbeit, Nuremberg.
Calmfors, L. (1994): “Active Labour Market Policy and Unemployment - A Framework for the
Analysis of Crucial Design Features,” OECD Economic Studies, 22, 7–47.
Contoyannis, P., and N. Rice (2001): “The Impact of Health on Wages: Evidence from the
British Household Panel Survey,” Empirical Economics, 26(4), 599–622.
Cre´pon, B., M. Dejemeppe, and M. Gurgand (2005): “Counseling the unemployed: does
it lower unemployment duration and recurrence?,” Working Paper No. 2005-27, Paris-Jourdan
Sciences Economiques.
Cutler, D. M., and E. Glaeser (2005): “What Explains Differences in Smoking, Drinking, and
Other Health-Related Behaviors?,” American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 95(2),
238–242.
Fairlie, R. W. (2005): “An extension of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique to logit and
probit models,” Journal of Economic and Social Measurement, 30, 305–316.
Forslund, A., P. Johansson, and L. Lindqvist (2004): “Employment Subsidies - A Fast Lane
from Unemployment to Work?,” Working Paper 2004:18, IFAU, Uppsala.
Gill, A. M., and R. J. Michaels (1992): “Does Drug Use Lower Wages?,” Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, 45(3), 419–434.
Gomulka, J., and N. Stern (1990): “The Employment of Married Women in the United Kingdom
1970-83,” Economica, 57, 171–199.
Heckman, J. J., R. J. LaLonde, and J. A. Smith (1999): “The Economics and Econometrics
of Active Labor Market Programs,” in Handbook of Labor Economics, ed. by O. Ashenfelter, and
D. Card, vol. 3A, chap. 31, pp. 1865–2097. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
18
Hujer, R., S. L. Thomsen, and C. Zeiss (2006a): “The Effects of Short-Term Training Measures
on the Individual Unemployment Duration in West Germany,” Discussion Paper No. 06-65, ZEW,
Mannheim.
(2006b): “The Effects of Vocational Training Programmes on the Duration of Unemploy-
ment in Eastern Germany,” Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv, 90(2), 299–322.
Jann, B. (2007): “FAIRLIE: Stata module to generate nonlinear decomposition of binary outcome
differentials,” Stata module. Statistical Software Components, Boston College Department of
Economics.
Kluve, J. (2006): “The Effectiveness of European Active Labor Market Policy,” Discussion Paper
No. 2018, IZA, Bonn.
Lechner, M., and J. Smith (2007): “What is the Value Added by Caseworkers,” Labour Eco-
nomics, 14(2), 135–151.
Lechner, M., and C. Wunsch (2008): “What Did All the Money Do? On the General Ineffec-
tiveness of Recent West German Labour Market Programmes,” Kyklos, 61(1), 134–174.
Levine, P. B., T. A. Gustafson, and A. D. Velenchik (1997): “More Bad News for Smokers?
The Effects of Cigarette Smoking on Wages,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 50(3), 493–
509.
Lorentzen, T., and E. Dahl (2005): “Active Labour Market Programmes in Norway: Are They
Helpful for Social Assistance Recipients?,” International Journal of Social Welfare, 14, 86–98.
Martin, P., and D. Grubb (2001): “What Works and for Whom: A Review of OECD Countries
Experiences with Active Labour Market Policies,” Swedish Economic Policy Review, 8, 9–56.
Montgomery, J. D. (1991): “Social Networks and Labor-Market Outcomes: Toward an Economic
Analysis,” The American Economic Review, 81(5), 1408–1418.
Oaxaca, R. (1973): “Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets,” International
Economic Review, 14, 693–708.
Oaxaca, R., and M. Ransom (1994): “On discrimination and the decomposition of wage differ-
entials,” Journal of Econometrics, 61(1), 5–21.
OECD (2007a): “Activating the Unemployed: What Countries Do: Further Material,”
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/41/38976231.pdf.
OECD (2007b): OECD Employment OutlookParis.
Rosholm, M., and M. Svarer (2004): “Estimating the Threat Effect of Active Labor Market
Programs,” Working Paper No. 2004-06, University of Aarhus.
Stephan, G., S. Ra¨ssler, and T. Schewe (2006): “Wirkungsanalyse in der Bundesagentur fu¨r
Arbeit - Konzeption, Datenbasis und ausgewa¨hlte Befunde,” Discussion Paper No. 07/2006, IAB.
19
Thomsen, S. L. (2007): Evaluating the Employment Effects of Job Creation Schemes in Germany,
vol. 36 of ZEW Economic Studies. Physica-Verlag.
van den Berg, G. J. (2001): “Duration Models: Specification, Identification, and Multiple Dura-
tions,” in Handbook of Econometrics, ed. by J. J. Heckman, and E. Leamer, vol. 5, chap. 55, pp.
3381–3462. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
van Ours, J. C. (2004): “The Locking-In Effect of Subsidized Jobs,” Journal of Comparative
Economics, 32(1), 37–52.
Yun, M. (2004): “Decomposing differences in the first moment,” Economics Letters, 82, 275–280.
(2005): “Hypothesis test when decomposing differences in the first moment,” Journal of
Economic and Social Measurement, 30, 295–304.
20
A Appendix
Table A.1: Logit Estimates on Employment for Different Samples
Full Sample Men Women Short-term
Unemployed
Long-term
Unemployed
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Soft skills
capacity for teamwork 0.8565 1.0907 0.6006 0.4818 –
learning aptitude 0.7127* 0.6669 0.9250 1.3829** -0.8864
Elementary skills (references: poor skills)
reading (satisfactory) 1.5451 17.2537*** -1.3174 17.0048*** -0.5680
reading (good) 1.2757 16.9595*** -1.5113 16.8616*** -1.2472
calculating (satisfactory) -0.6583 -0.2341 -0.9400 -1.0976* 16.3600***
calculating (good) -0.1827 0.2156 -0.3769 -0.6319 16.8537***
internet (satisfactory) 0.1622 -0.0484 0.3220 -0.0071 0.9589*
internet (good) 0.1177 -0.2935 0.5947** 0.0110 0.6205
Education (reference: low-skilled)
medium-skilled 0.2363 0.2596 0.1833 0.2187 0.6203
high-skilled 0.2432 0.4522* -0.0764 0.2655 0.4921
Personality
responsibility 0.1332 -0.0977 0.3381 0.4833 -0.1138
socially integrated 0.0256 0.0724 -0.0314 0.1197 -0.4563
Experience and network
work experience 0.2316 0.2857 0.2020 0.1766 0.3454
social network 0.2319* 0.2709 0.2557 0.2378* 0.2687
Obstacles to employment
drug abuse -1.5585 -0.9636 – -1.2227 –
financial debts -0.4356 -0.6731 0.2904 -0.3433 -0.2378
care obligations -0.7217*** -0.5238 -0.9007*** -0.6354*** -1.4633*
Health (reference: poor)
health (satisfactory) 0.3036 0.2329 0.4688 0.2332 0.7178
health (good) 0.4293 0.3097 0.5916 0.3546 0.6966
Working ability (reference: 8 hours or more)
less than 6 hours -0.9116** – -0.5426 -0.7014* -1.6616
6 to 8 hours -0.6890*** -0.6355* -0.6129** -0.6873*** -0.6355
Concessions for a new job
work place far away -0.0767 -0.2055 0.0771 -0.1287 0.2673
job below qualification -0.1604 -0.0839 -0.3312 -0.1872 0.2233
change of occupation -0.1544 0.1565 -0.5267** -0.2262 0.1667
significantly lower wage 0.1091 0.1081 0.1543 0.2138 -0.3704
Socio-demographics (reference age group: 18 to 24 years)
women -0.1785 – – -0.2272 0.0145
no. of persons in hh 0.1874 0.2311 0.1641 0.1587 0.4088
no. of persons in hh (squared) -0.0274 -0.0319 -0.0223 -0.0213 -0.0849
25 to 34 years 0.0514 0.5341* -0.3678 0.0003 -0.2592
35 to 44 years -0.0419 0.3536 -0.3982 -0.0093 -0.8220
45 to 57 years -0.1345 0.2230 -0.4447 -0.1410 -0.7266
Regions (reference: West Germany, urban)
West Germany, rural 0.2208 0.0746 0.4442* 0.1165 1.0899**
East Germany, urban -0.1366 -0.1789 -0.1128 -0.2164 0.4925
East Germany, rural 0.0302 0.1713 -0.2037 -0.0523 0.3184
Self-assessed job chances
Good job chances 0.2677* 0.3851* 0.0844 0.3475** –
Groupa -1.1219*** -1.1121*** -1.1347*** – –
Constant -4.3628*** -20.7372 -1.5385 -19.8514 -18.6195
pseudo R2 0.1144 0.1018 0.1265 0.0674 0.1501
no. of obs. 1,841 916 864 1,273 487
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
a Group is a dummy taking value 1 if person in long-term unemployed in columns 1 to 3.
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